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Compressing Evil:  Representations of Space and the Geo-Political 
Imagination in World War II Films 
 
The argument of this paper is that cinematic representations of space – specifically 
representations of the compression of geographic space – stand as meaningful 
contributions to what I will call the “geo-political imagination.”  By “geo-political 
imagination,” I mean the construction of grand narratives for twentieth and, by 
association, twenty-first century geo-politics, or international politics on the global scale.  
It should be noted that this interest in narrative is not intended to indicate an allegiance to 
a specific narrative theory, of which there are many.  Rather, this paper departs from a 
recognition of the general tendency in historical theory over the past two or three decades 
to place narrativity, or story-telling and plot construction, in central positions as concerns 
historical knowledge.1  To that extent, this paper simply accepts theses asserting the 
creation of narratives as central to the historical imagination, and that the historical 
imagination is then central to the construction of socio-cultural identities. 
 
Now, as concerns the view of socio-cultural identities in this paper, it might be necessary 
to make certain qualifications.  First, the paper recognizes that we construct our 
imaginations of geo-political history on both individual and collective levels.  This 
happens in conjunction with various media, such as film (emphasized here).  However, at 
the discursive level, such media become conjoined with, among other things, the 
information disseminated both within and across societies via interpersonal 
communication and through institutions.  Therein, in tact with theses asserting the 
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increasing deterritorialization of culture in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, this 
paper views the construction of geo-political narratives as happening asymmetrically on a 
geographical basis (i.e., they develop differently in different cultural geographies).  The 
construction of geo-political narratives also happens across the bordlerlines of multiple 
linguistic, ethnic and political demographies.2  The view here, then, is that there is no one 
global geo-political imagination.  However, it is also accepted that there are cases to be 
made for the globalization of particularly powerful and widespread geo-political 
narratives for the twentieth century, to which the films analyzed here are viewed as 
contributing. 
 
At the narrative level, the central event in this paper is World War II, and specifically the 
defeat of Nazism.  What I am concerned with here is the generation and reproduction of 
what might be thought of as a kind of “school book” historical narrative concerning the 
Second World War, or set of stories told in school teaching history, museums, popular 
television shows and books (both fiction and non-fiction) and over dinner tables in which 
World War II and the defeat of Nazism features prominently and are taken as connected 
to other historical events in the twentieth century, such the victory of liberal democracy 
and communism and their eventual conflict in the form of the Cold War (and then again 
that event’s end as giving birth to our current postmodern, asymmetrical [and oft-
confusing] geo-political situation).  At the narrative level, the assertion here is that the 
defeat of Nazism at the political level is taken as a tipping point, or conjunctive space, 
between succeeding and preceding events and trends also involved in larger imaginations 
of twentieth century geo-political history.  Very roughly, that narrative runs as follows.  
Firstly, Nazism represents an absolute evil whose defeat was a historical necessity, or a 
victory worth having achieved almost no matter the costs of the war or the questionable 
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actions and/or values of those regimes victorious over Germany’s particular and powerful 
brand of fascism in the 1930s and ‘40s.  The victory over Nazism took a particular form, 
however, as it was specifically liberal democracy and communism that were victorious 
qua ideologies and political systems, the eventual clash between which gave the world the 
Cold War – again, the end of which accounts for our current geo-political complexities, 
many of which can seem irregular and unpredictable.  Of course, also implicit in these 
themes dating from the late 1940s are further historical thematic which extend backwards 
in time from the Second World War.  The problem of the political ideologies vying for 
ultimate victory in the Second World War refers back to the rise of various nineteenth 
century European political ideas (e.g., nationalism, socialism and communism, liberalism 
and [if it may be considered an ideology] imperialism).  These then become coupled with 
the growth of industry and associated changes in the structures of Western society.  This 
narrative, insofar as it flows up again to the Second World War points forward to the rise 
of international political, military and economic competition, the event of the First World 
War and the ensuing years of economic boom and bust between the wars.  In other words, 
the suggestion is that many of us have a sense of the idea that, while it may be common 
for academics to refer to as the “short twentieth century” as having begun with the First 
World War or the Russian Revolution, it is also common to view the Second World War 
as the final defeat of certain strains of the worst in nineteenth century European political 
ideologies and their institutional and cultural embeddedness.3  War II, like World War I 
and the Cold War, thus serves as a particular narrative high point in our understanding of 
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries; World War II tips us away from the nineteenth 
century and toward the twenty-first.  And, within that “tipping,” and the narratives 
surrounding it, the destruction of Nazi politics is central. 
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Let us now look at the films on which this paper focuses: Tom Hanks’ and Steven 
Spielberg’s Band of Brothers (2001), Joseph Vilsmaier’s Stalingrad (1992) and Oliver 
Hirschbiegel’s Der Untergang (2004).  The choice of these three films, though admittedly 
involving a degree of eclecticism, is based on their combination of popularity, genre 
diversity and socio-cultural context.  Brothers, for example, is in fact a cinematic mini-
series in ten parts originally aired on HBO, serving as something of a sequel to 
Spielberg’s 1998 Saving Private Ryan.  Along with Ryan, Brothers has contributed to 
what John Bodnar has called the recovery of a new “post-War memory” in the United 
States.4  As characterized by Bodnar, this memory is patriotic, yet acknowledges the deep 
personal trauma of battle.  The new American war hero is more than a patriotic macho 
man of the John Wayne ilk.   
 
Stanlingrad and Untergang have other contexts.  As German films, one of the contexts 
for their production is and has been the continuing struggle of German society to come to 
terms with its participation in – and indeed, instigation of – the Second World War, 
including the Holocaust.  In the case of Stanlingrad specifically, production came closely 
on the heels of the 1989 reunification of that country.  This reunification involved (and 
continues to involve) attempts to examine and renew German national consciousness.  
While there has been a great deal of speculation about what social issues led to the 
creation of Untergang, it might suffice to say that the fascination with Hitler might never 
be expunged from modern consciousness, German or otherwise.5  This might simply be 
posited as due to the extremity and calculated nature of the crimes perpetrated under 
Hitler’s rule, traceable, at least in part, to his inhumane and violent socio-political beliefs. 
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What is common to all the films addressed here is that, with varying degrees of 
obviousness and subtlety, particular portrayals of movement through geographic space 
reproduce the kind of geo-political narrative described in the third paragraph of this paper 
– extending nineteenth century political and ideological trends into the twentieth, the 
destruction of certain of those trends, and the opening into new geo-political 
configurations principally embodied in the Cold War and then again post-Cold War 
global milieu. Again, this is a narrative to which many of us have been exposed, be it via 
school teaching and textbooks, museums, television documentaries or perhaps casual 
reading we might have done in either non-fiction or fictional genres:  Nazi evil came from 
a bastardization of European political ideas, was destroyed by a more or less virtuous 
effort ultimately led by the Americans and Soviets (thought British eyes might read the 
situation differently), the victory of these powers gave us the Cold War and the end of 
that conflict gave us the global political situation we have today.  Herein, we are 
confronted with particular geographic images organized around the destruction of Nazism 
and its political, social and cultural life.  This image, one might say, involves a kind of 
grand map of Europe with Allied pincers closing in on Germany in the latter years of the 
War.  Now, as many of know, at the factual level, this movement dates from the late-
1942, early-1943 Battle of Stalingrad on the Soviet side – that battle which is the subject 
of the film Stalingrad.  From the Anglo-American side, the pincer movement dates from 
the June, 1944 D-Day invasion, though the 1943 invasion of Italy is not to be discounted.   
 
Again, the point is that many of us, even without university, or perhaps even secondary, 
educations have some sense of these events, and the geographic motions involved – many 
of us, I would suggest, can in fact evoke an image of a large map of Europe with arrows 
moving towards Germany from the east and west, as well as, perhaps, a bit from the 
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south.  Again, involved in this image is a sense of the ending of a particular European 
past – those strains of thinking that lead to fascism, and gave it a prominent place on the 
global stage.  Similarly, this image is evocative of the start of a new global political future 
– one that, at the factual level, includes the worlds of the Cold War and the political 
figurations that emerged (and continue to emerge) in the wake of that global political and 
ideological confrontation.  All of this is contingent, however, upon the compression, 
destruction and eradication of Nazi evil in the heart of Europe. 
 
Among the films analyzed here, Brothers is most explicit in its portrayal of the above-
described motion through geographic space and its larger implications.  The film’s central 
characters are parachute infantrymen who prepared the Anglo-American D-Day invasion 
by dropping behind enemy lines before the famous beach landings which have been the 
subject of so many other films – most recently Saving Private Ryan (but also film’s like 
The Longest Day [1962], The Big Red One [1980] and Where Eagles Dare [1969]).  After 
securing the ground in Normandy, the soldiers in Brothers engage in the westward push 
toward Germany, participating in such famous events as the Battle of the Bulge, 
liberating a concentration camp (Kaufering IV) and capturing Hitler’s “Eagle’s Nest” at 
Berchtesgarten.  At the level of characterization, the soldiers portrayed in Brothers are in 
step with Bodnar’s description of the new American post-War memory – they are 
simultaneously patriots yet pragmatic individuals prone to pain and trauma.  In terms of 
the issue of space and motion, however, and the contribution of portrayals of space and 
motion to the geo-political imagination, of interest is that the film’s characters explicitly 
ask questions throughout the series about when they might be able to “jump into Berlin,” 
who will reach Germany first (the Americans or the Soviets?) and make commentaries 
about how far they have traveled in a geographic sense.  In part, as the series makes clear, 
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this is because the characters want to end the war and go home; they want to travel back 
to their point of origin, the “home base” of their movement through geo-political space.   
 
However, as their journey across western Europe illustrates – most poignantly portrayed 
in their encounter with a concentration camp – the characters’ interest in moving toward 
Germany is also based at some level on a recognition of the political realities of Nazism 
and an engagement with the historical necessity in defeating Nazism as an idea that 
gained a political, social and cultural life.  For example, in a pointed scene in one of the 
series’ later episodes, one of the central characters, standing on the bed of a troop truck as 
columns of American forces proceed into Germany and columns of surrendered Germans 
march in the opposite direction, engages in an emotional outburst against the Germans, 
yelling at them that they are “fascist pigs” who have “drag[ged] [their – the Americans’] 
asses half way around the world.”  “You ignorant, servile scum,” yells the character.  
“What the fuck are we doing here?”  What is indicated by the character’s question is that, 
indeed, he knows precisely what they, the American troops, are doing there:  defeating 
Nazism and the social and political realities – evils, in their minds – that accompany it.   
 
Beyond a recognition of the evil involved in Nazism, however, there is a recognition of 
what that defeat will entail, especially at the level of geographical movement.  The defeat 
of Nazism will involve not truce and surrender but, in part due to the kind of politics that 
ideology represents and the specific manner of the prosecution of the war under its aegis 
(including the Holocaust), the defeat of Nazism would involve entering the political 
geographic space of that ideology (Germany) and engaging in a variety of destruction of 
that political geographic space.  At the visual and cinematic levels, reinforcing this idea is 
one of the effects of viewers following the characters of Brothers travelling from west to 
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east toward Germany, traversing the relatively long distances of geographical space that 
they are portrayed as covering. 
 
Vilsmaier’s Stalingrad is more subtle about the representation of movement and 
geographic space and the reproduction of the “textbook” geo-political narrative to which I 
earlier referred.  Nonetheless, it is present, and plays an important role in understanding 
the film.  As does Hirschbiegel in Untergang, Vilsmaier looks at the war from the 
German side, following a small group of engineers through the Battle of Stalingrad to 
their eventual death as part of the destruction of the German Sixth Army that famously 
punctuated the fighting on the Volga.  In spatial terms, the movements represented in 
Stalingrad are generally small – hence the subtlety; there is no cross-continental journey 
like that had in Brothers, from northern France to southern Germany and eventually 
Austria.  Moreover, many of the scenes in Stalingrad involve street fighting inside the 
city of Stalingrad itself – also a relatively small geographical space.  Two scenes 
specifically, however, play into the geographical construction of the larger geo-political 
imagination had of events surrounding the end of the war.  In one scene, the main 
characters (again, German engineers) are forced to beat back a Soviet tank advance that 
was part of Russia’s encirclement and eventual destruction of the German forces.  This is 
the beginning of the Soviet rollback of the German advance in the beginning of 1943 – a 
roll back that would not end until it reached Germany, and, in fact, Berlin itself.  Another 
scene features the last German plane evacuating injured soldiers and officers before Hitler 
famously abandoned the Sixth Army, leaving it to be destroyed by the Soviets.  This also 
involves an east to west movement whose ultimate destination is Germany itself – the 
evacuation plane, or any other plane, for that matter, would not return again to that far 
eastern outpost in the front line against the Soviets.  Unlike Brothers, in Stalingrad, we do 
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not visually follow the victorious armies of the Allies (in this case, the Soviets) into 
Germany.  However, we are given a clear sense that this is where the war is heading; in 
the end, only destruction lay ahead for Germany, and a new global political future was in 
the making.  The war will leave Russian soil and head for the geographic origin 
(Germany) out of which it sprung. 
 
Lastly, the recent and popular Der Untergang represents what might be thought of as a 
combination of the obviousness of Brother’s portrayal of geographic movement – and 
spatio-geographic compression specifically – with Stalingrad’s subtlety.  The obvious 
dimensions of these geographical elements come in relation to the entire film’s slightly 
claustrophobic feel.  Based, among others, on Joachim Fest’s historical work, 
Hirschbiegel investigates the very last days of the Reich through an intimate picture of 
Hitler in the last months of the European war.6  At that point, political and military 
command of Germany, such as it was in 1945, takes place within a network of 
underground halls and rooms placed under the Reichschancellory – the famous 
Führerbunker.  This bunker was constructed for precisely such a variety of destruction as 
is portrayed in the film:  Germany’s final and utter destruction, with street fighting in the 
capital.  This itself has significance for what I am terming the geo-political imagination:  
Hirschbiegel offers a clear portrayal of the nearly exhausted power of the German war 
machine by illustrating that the once vast empire held by the Nazis had been reduced to 
the size of an underground office building.  This is an irony when compared with what 
would come next as concerned the allied advances from the east and west.  With the 
victory of those forces, the territories of geo-political conflict would once again expand, 
covering the vast global terrains encompassed by the Soviet-American – or at least liberal 
democratic-communist – Cold War. 
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Perhaps Untergang’s most telling scene in terms of the representation of space and 
movement, however, comes when one of the film’s characters attempts to collect medical 
supplies to bring to the Führerbunker.  Traveling to the frontlines as they existed at that 
point in Berlin, the character, a medical officer, is told he cannot get to a hospital due to 
the proximity of the Soviet advance.  Insisting on collecting the supplies anyway, the 
character is then told that he can pass if he wishes, but that this will be at his own risk.  
As the medical officer moves forward, a guard calls out to him as he passes the gun barrel 
of a parked tank.  “Do you see that?  That’s the end of the Reich.  Beyond that, it’s 
‘Ruskiland.’”  In terms of what I am suggesting is a filmatic reproduction of “school 
history book” consciousness of the end of World War II, Untergang’s character stands at 
the point of one of the long arrows extending from east to west that one can find on any 
number of historical maps outlining the last years of the European war.  The Allied 
advance from the east (that of the Soviets) had reached its utmost extreme, and the 
compression of Nazi Germany – and hence politically institutionalized and geo-politically 
meaningful Nazism itself – was, at least in the film, nearly complete. 
 
This paper might be summarized with the following remarks.  Along with history 
teaching, historical novels, television programming, museums and various modes of 
interpersonal communication, films play an important role in the dissemination and 
creation of historical consciousness.  What I am calling the geo-political imagination – 
our master narratives of twentieth and, again, by implication, twenty-first century geo-
politics – are part of the processes and forces involved in socio-cultural identity 
formation; plainly put, socio-cultural identities involve the construction of larger 
narratives about the world in which we find ourselves, the values we find in them and the 
social and institutional forms we give to those values (politics).  An important dimension 
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of the geo-political narrative of the twentieth century is the spatio-geographic 
compression of Nazism as a political, social and cultural entity.  By “spatial 
compression,” I mean Nazism’s physical and geographical diminishment and eventual 
eradication from the larger geo-political stage.  That at any kind of larger socio-cultural 
level, we maintain a sense of and ability to imagine such a narrative, and that we may 
extend that narrative forward into the historical spaces of the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries, is due in part – in part – to representations of space, and specifically 
representations of the compression of geographical space, such as those employed in 
films like Band of Brothers, Stalingrad and Der Untergang. 
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